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WELCOME

PROF. FISCH: Good evening. My name is Jill Fisch.' I am the
Director of the Fordham Center for Corporate, Securities & Financial
Law. On behalf of the Center and the entire Law School community, I
want to welcome you to tonight's program.
For some of you, this is the first time that you are attending a
Corporate Center program. Let me take just a couple of minutes to tell
you about the Corporate Center.
John Feerick 2 established the Center four years ago to serve as a
focal point for business-law issues at the Law School. Since that time,
we have run a variety of programs, public events, policy roundtables,
academic conferences, and student-oriented programs. The list of our
events is too extensive to cover in full, but let me give you just a couple
of highlights.
The Center hosts two annual public lectures, the A.A. Sommer, Jr.,
Lecture, which is sponsored by the firm of Morgan Lewis & Bockius,
and the Albert A. DeStefano Lecture, sponsored by the firm of Becker
Ross Stone DeStefano & Klein. Past Sommer lecturers have been an
incredibly distinguished group. This past fall, Richard Ketchum, Chief
Regulatory Officer of the New York Stock Exchange, delivered the
Sommer Lecture.3 The DeStefano Lecture has been a variety of

1. Jill E. Fisch is the Alpin J. Cameron Professor of Law at the Fordham
University School of Law and is the Director of the Fordham Center for Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law.
2. John D. Feerick is the Norris Professor of Law at the Fordham University
School of Law.
3. CCH Incorporated, NYSE Official Focuses on Independence of Exchange
Regulatory Arm (Dec. 7, 2004), available at http://business.cch.com/securitiesLaw/

2006]

BIGGER CARROTS AND BIGGER STICKS

different lectures, as well as some panel discussions, on market
regulation and the future of the self-regulatory organizations. Just last
week, this year's DeStefano Lecture was delivered by New York State
Attorney General Eliot Spitzer. I understand that Fordham made The
Wall Street Journalas a result,5 which isn't a bad thing.
The Center has hosted a number of other programs. In January, we
held a roundtable on mutual and hedge-fund regulation, which followed
prior programs on the evolving duty of good faith in corporate directors
and the role of lawyers as gatekeepers. Next Fall we are scheduled to
host an academic conference, the Eugene P. and Delia S. Murphy
Conference on Corporate Law, which will be part of the Fordham
Centennial Celebration.
We have introduced students to business-law issues through
specialized business-law courses, many of which are taught by leaders in
the field who, after hours, devote time to serving on our adjunct faculty.
We also offer students informal career guidance and insight into practice
issues through our Business Law Practitioner Series. The Center boasts
one of the first clinical programs in securities arbitration in the country
and a specialized business-law journal, the Journal of Corporate and
FinancialLaw. You have met some of our student editors who are here
tonight.
The Corporate Center is led by a distinguished Board of Advisors.
Two of the advisors have gone above and beyond the call of duty in
doing virtually all the work in putting together tonight's program. I
want to publicly acknowledge and thank Pamela Chepiga 6 and Judge
Loretta Preska7 for all their hard work.
I also want to thank Professors Beth Young' and Caroline Gentile, 9
who have also worked tremendously hard on tonight's program.

news/i 2-07-04.asp.
4. Gene Colter, Deals & Deal Makers, WALL ST. J., Apr. 15, 2005, at C4.
5. Id.
6. Pamela Rogers Chepiga is a partner at Allen & Overy LLP.
7. Judge Loretta A. Preska is a U.S. District Court judge for the Southern District
of New York.
8. Beth Young is a former Associate Professor at the Fordham University School
of Law and is the former Corporate Fellow at the Fordham Center for Corporate,
Securities and Financial Law.
9. Caroline Gentile is an Associate Professor at the Fordham University School of
Law.
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Tonight's program is entitled "Bigger Carrots and Bigger Sticks:
Issues and Developments in Corporate Sentencing."
The series of corporate scandals revealed over the past few years,
coupled with a host of new regulations aimed at identifying, redressing,
and preventing corporate misconduct,' ° have dramatically increased the
level of enforcement attention directed to U.S. companies. Prosecutors
have new powers, both in their investigatory tools and in the types of
sanctions they can seek." At the same time, corporations have become
more proactive in instituting internal controls and initiating internal
investigations of potential wrongdoing.
At times, the emphasis on enforcement can create tension. Today's
corporations face substantial pressure to report potential problems to
regulators at an early stage. Regulators are increasingly demanding
access to corporate information. Sentencing rules impose substantial
penalties for corporate failure to cooperate with regulators. 12 Yet
concern about cooperation may impede corporate efforts to investigate
and respond to potential wrongdoing, particularly if the price of
cooperation is a compelled waiver of the attorney-client privilege.
Increased remedial authority also raises issues about the most
appropriate way to address corporate misconduct. Regulators are facing
public demands that individual wrongdoers be held personally
accountable.
At the same time, money penalties are reaching
unprecedented levels. Sometimes the penalties seem disproportionate to
the public harm, and some have questioned whether corporate-level
penalties, penalties that are typically borne by the issuer's current
stockholders, are an appropriate response to misconduct by corporate
officials.
I can't imagine a better-qualified group to address these issues than
tonight's panel. Let me introduce you to the moderator of the panel although he needs no introduction - the Honorable John S. Martin, Jr.
Judge Martin is currently Of Counsel to the firm of Debevoise &
10.
See Developments in the Law - Corporationsand Society, 117 HARv. L. REv.
2169, 2174 (2004).
11.
See Marie Tracey & Paul Fiorelli, Nothing Concentrates the Mind Like the
Prospect of a Hanging: The Criminalizationof the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 25 N. ILL. U. L.
REv. 125, 135-37 (2004).
12.
Kathleen F. Brickey, Symposium: White Collar Criminal Law in Comparative
Perspective: The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 221, 240-42
(2004).
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Plimpton, and a member of the firm's Litigation Department. Prior to
joining Debevoise in 2003, Judge Martin served for thirteen years as a
United States District Judge for the Southern District of New York and
for three years as the United States Attorney for the Southern District of
New York. Judge Martin's past experience also includes service as
Assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States and consultant to
the National Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration
of Criminal Justice.
He graduated from Manhattan College in 1957 and received his law
degree from Columbia Law School in 1961.
Judge Martin, welcome. The floor is yours.
INTRODUCTION

JUDGE MARTIN: Thank you.
Since we have a panel that needs no introduction, I will be very
brief in identifying the people here.
Richard Breeden now has his own company, Richard Breeden &
Co.13 He is a former Chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and has served as a monitor appointed by the court in the
WorldCom case. 14 I saw his good work in a case called UnitedStates v.
PatrickBennett.15 Bennett Funding was one of the biggest frauds of all
time. 16 Mr. Breeden came in and tried to rescue the assets for the
creditors and people who had been defrauded.
Sitting next to Mr. Breeden is Tim Coleman, 7 Senior Counsel to
the - I understand, as of today, departing - Deputy Attorney General,
Jim Comey.' 8 Tim's major qualification is that he was once an Assistant
13. Richard C. Breeden currently serves on the board of directors of BBVA, one of
Europe's largest banks. His firm, Richard C. Breeden & Co., offers turnaround
advisory services and strategic consulting to companies experiencing financial or
governance distress.
14. See In re Worldcom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 388 F. Supp. 2d 319 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
15. United States v. Bennett, 97 CR 639, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4928 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 18, 2000).
16. Id.
17. Tom Coleman is a senior Justice Department lawyer and its representative on
the Corporate Fraud Task Force.
18. Jim Comey served as Deputy Attorney General after being nominated by
President George W. Bush. He was unanimously confirmed by the U.S. Senate on
December 9, 2003.

166

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LA W

[Vol. XI

United States Attorney in the Southern District of New York.
Sitting next to Tim is Steve Cutler, 9 who, as you know, is the
Director of the Division of Enforcement at the SEC. He, too, has
announced that he will soon be leaving that position and learning how
unreasonable the SEC can be.
Sitting next to Steve is not David Kelley, who could not be here,
but Celeste Koeleveld, who is the Chief of the Criminal Division. The
most important position she has ever held is that of Chief Appellate
Attorney in the United States Attorney's Office. I say that not only
because I once held that position, but because it is a position that was
held by a number of people, including Tony Sifton2 ° of the Eastern
District, John Sprizzo, 2 ' Pierre Leval,22 Mary Jo White,2 3 and Gerry
Lynch,24 among others. So we can expect even greater things for
Celeste.
Finally, Richard Walker,2 5 the Global General Counsel of Corporate
and Investment Banking at Deutsche Bank, a former SEC General
Counsel and head of the Division of Enforcement.
We are really honored to have this distinguished group of people.
PANEL DISCUSSION
JUDGE MARTIN: I thought I would get the ball rolling by
allowing the panelists to comment on the following proposition. To
paraphrase the National Rifle Association, corporations do not commit
crimes; people do. Then why is it that we are sanctioning, through civil

19. Stephen M. Cutler left the SEC's Division of Enforcement in April 2005 and is
currently co-chair of the Securities Department at the law firm of Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP, where he is a partner.
20. Charles P. Sifton is a district judge in the U.S. District Court, Eastern District
of New York.
Hon. John E. Sprizzo is a district judge in the U.S. District Court, Southern
21.
District of New York.
22. Hon. Pierre N. Leval is a circuit judge in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit.
23. Mary Jo White is Chair of the lawyer litigation group of Debevoise & Plimpton
LLP.
24. Hon. Gerard E. Lynch is a district judge in the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of New York.
25. Richard H. Walker served as SEC General Counsel from 1996-1998, and
Director, Division of Enforcement of the SEC from 1998-2001.

2006]

BIGGER CARROTS AND BIGGER STICKS

proceedings by the SEC and criminal proceedings by the Department of
Justice, corporations rather than the individuals who commit the crime?
I think we should start by giving the Justice Department the first
whack at that one.
MR. COLEMAN: Is that me or Celeste?
JUDGE MARTIN: Jump ball.
MR. COLEMAN: If the question is whether there is a point to
prosecuting corporations as opposed to individuals, I think the answer
has to be a resounding, yes, there is a point. Corporations, especially
large corporations, can do a lot more harm to the public than any
individual.
Prosecuting individual employees and officers of the
corporation does not necessarily mean that a corporation will stop doing
the bad things that it does.
What we have seen in a number of cases are corporations that, over
time, develop a culture that fosters, and even requires, wrongdoing and
criminal conduct. Sometimes - it is a rare case, but sometimes - it is
necessary to prosecute the corporation to stop that corruption from
continuing. The corporation can not only harm individual investors and
other stakeholders in the corporation, but it can have dramatic impacts
on the integrity of the capital markets and the economy as a whole. We
saw this a couple of years ago with the whole constellation of scandals
involving Enron and WorldCom and Adelphia and a number of other
major corporations.
Prosecuting the corporation criminally does a number of things.
One thing it does is, it gives an opportunity to send a very powerful
message of deterrence that can be much stronger than the deterrent
message that you get from prosecuting an individual. It is a message
that can resound throughout an industry and cause other participants in
the industry to change their behavior, and can even have effects across
the entire economy.
So with all respect to the National Rifle Association, I will have to
take issue on the paraphrase and say that the answer is yes.
JUDGE MARTIN: Steve, what is the SEC's perception of that
issue?
MR. CUTLER: Maybe I should start by saying that my views are
only my own, and not those of the SEC or the staff. That has probably
never been as true as it is today, at least in the last several years.
I do not disagree with anything Tim said. Maybe it is useful to
actually think of the prosecution, both civilly and criminally, of
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companies in two distinct ways. One is prosecutions where the victims
are third parties, and the other is prosecutions where the victims - and
Jill mentioned this in her opening - are the company's own security
holders. Certainly, the issue of whether it is fair and appropriate and
sensible to proceed against a company, I think, takes on more - the
criticisms of company prosecutions, I think, resonate more - when you
are, by virtue of the prosecution, visiting harm against the very people
who suffered from the wrongful conduct in the first place.
So let me put a marker there, because I think it is important that we
talk about each of those separate situations. I think it is a lot easier for
people to come to grips with the notion of penalizing an entity that was
trying to do something to put more money in its coffers or to save it
from expenses that it otherwise would have incurred.
You can think of examples from many walks of life. You can think
of, say, an investment firm that visits fraud upon its customers. The
customers are not owners of the firm, but they are third parties. If an
investment firm commits a lot of fraud and gets more people to buy a
product, that puts more money in the company's coffers. How do you
deter that? How do you get rid of it?
To me, it seems an almost unassailable proposition that you go after
the entity because the conduct has benefited the entity. Examples in
other industries come to mind - in the environmental area, a company
that dumps a bunch of pollutants into a lake, instead of doing what it
needs to do to remediate, which would cost it a lot of money.
I am not sure that a lot of people in this debate have been arguing
about those types of cases. What they have really been taking issue with
is whether it makes sense to punish companies - something that has
become much more common over the last three to five years, which is
prosecutions of companies that have committed financial reporting
misconduct - where, by virtue of that misconduct, they have hurt their
own owners.
I think it is very tricky. Invariably, you do have to face several
questions: Who are we visiting the penalty upon? Who is paying for it?
Have they already suffered? Haven't they suffered enough?
I still think you go back to questions of deterrence. Tim talked
about specific deterrence and stopping the misconduct at the company
you are punishing. I guess the way I think of penalties against corporate
entities - and this applies to both sorts of situations I alluded to - is that
what you are after is the fundamentally honest CEO or CFO, when she
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wakes up in the morning and looks at herself in the mirror and says to
herself, "What am I going to spend my day doing?" That CEO or CFO
is not, if she is fundamentally honest - which is my proposition - going
to go steal, lie, or cheat. The question is whether she is going to make
sure that other people do not.
The prosecutions of Bernie Ebbers and Ken Lay and Andy Fastow,
and on and on and on, in some way, do not affect that fundamentally
honest CEO or CFO, because she is never going to find herself on the
wrong side of the law. She is not going to lie, cheat, or steal. But we
want more from that CEO or CFO. We want to make sure that she has
created - and Tim mentioned this - a culture of compliance, a good
corporate culture, so that it does not happen around her. How can we
give her the incentive to do that? How can we use law enforcement as a
tool to create that kind of inducement?
I think one of the ways you do it is through the prospect of a
penalty. There will never be a prosecution against that honest CEO or
CFO, but if at the end of the day her company fails to comply with the
law, if her company commits fraud, she and her company will pay for it.
Those are terms that every executive in America can understand.
So when I think about penalties against companies, it is that CEO or
CFO that I am thinking about.
Let me spend just one minute - I have probably gone on too long,
and I will pass the baton - talking about penalties visiting harm on those
who have already suffered. When Congress actually gave the SEC the
power to impose penalties against non-broker dealers, non-investment
advisors - the unregulated part of our capital markets - it said, we want
you to be very careful about visiting harm upon those who have already
suffered.26 If you look at what the Commission did in the years
preceding the adoption of Sarbanes-Oxley,2 7 it was to avoid penalties in
almost every case against corporate entities where the misconduct being
charged was a fraud upon the company's own security holders.
Dick will tell you, in his regime as director, I think we had maybe
two or three cases where we imposed penalties against corporate entities
26. See Zack Christensen, The Fair Funds For Investors Provision of SarbanesOxley: Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 339,
359-60.
27.
See William R. McLucas et al., An Overview of SEC Enforcement, Remedial
and Settlement Powers Before and After the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 1396 P.L.I. CORP
1111, 1113-17 (2003).
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in those sorts of situations, because they involved very unique
circumstances. I should probably leave it at that.
The reason why we have taken a different tack more recently is
because Sarbanes-Oxley has allowed the Commission to take the money
that it would otherwise obtain in the form of a penalty and put it back in
the hands of those investors who suffered, by virtue of the SarbanesOxley Fair Funds provision. 28 At least in that way, you mitigate the
harm that would otherwise be suffered by those who have already
suffered as a result of the misconduct.
That is why I think we are in a much different place today than the
Commission was five or ten years ago.
JUDGE MARTIN: Dick Walker, is what the Commission has done
good or ill?
MR. WALKER: I want to challenge a couple of the things that
Steve said, but let me, to get to that point, start at the beginning and MR. CUTLER: And, by the way, Dick trained me, and everything I
have done he is responsible for.
MR. WALKER: It is a very dangerous thing for me. I have two
former bosses sitting here, Richard Breeden and Steve Cutler, who,
though my deputy, I always looked to for real advice.
JUDGE MARTIN: I see, arguably, three purposes that can be
served by penalizing corporations, either in the enforcement or the
criminal context. One is to take away the fruits of ill-gotten activity.
That, to me, is a very legitimate goal and a very legitimate objective. It
is something the Commission does all the time in the form of
disgorgement. It basically tells the wrongdoer, "You have got to give
back the profits that you made." To me, that is sort of a no-brainer, and
no harm comes from that. From a criminal prosecution, I do not think
that that is a customary feature of criminal prosecution, but it is certainly
covered on the civil side.
The second objective which is articulated is punishment. Again,
the law allows entities and individuals to be punished, to have some
stigma attached to their conduct, to make some hurt to what people have
done.
The third is, of course, the argument about deterrence, whether it
specifically deters some and whether it acts as general deterrence to
others. That argument I have a harder time understanding.
28.

15 U.S.C. 7246(a) (2002).
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Steve, in your example, you talked about the honest CEO who
wakes up in the morning, who, because she knows that there has been a
$750 million penalty imposed against WorldCom, says, "Of course, I am
not personally threatened by that, because I am an honest, hardworking
CEO, and I am not about to stray from the straight and narrow. But I am
going to work extra hard to prevent others in my company from
engaging in wrongdoing."
I think there is some truth to that. But when you balance that
against the effects to innocent parties of imposing a large fine and a
penalty, it seems to me a bit disproportionate. Are there other ways that
you can achieve deterrence without imposing a monetary fine that is
going to harm people that had no responsibility or culpability for the
wrongdoing?
In the case of WorldCom, shareholders come and go- well,
WorldCom is a bad case, because, frankly, WorldCom was bankrupt by
the time this was imposed. Let us take another company as to which a
fine has been imposed. In that case, the fine is borne by the shareholders
of the company. The company pays, and the current shareholders are
the ones that lose. They very well may be a different group of people
than the people who were shareholders and perhaps had some
opportunity to influence management at the time of wrongdoing.
I just worry that there is a disproportionate harm to the monetary
sanction - though I can see that there is some deterrence that is achieved
by having the honest CEO worry about doing more, and even the
dishonest CEO or CFO, which I think we have seen, really, the largest
number of in the large prosecutions of the last two or three years. I think
there is deterrence as to those people. But is there deterrence because
you are suing their company, or is there deterrence because they know
that they are going to be criminally prosecuted, like Bernie Ebbers?29
That, to me, achieves great deterrence, when a white-collar executive of
a company says, "Wow, if I break the law, there is a chance that I could
go to jail." And jail, for white-collar defendants, I think, is a much
worse proposition than perhaps other defendants JUDGE MARTIN: And it is getting worse.
MR. WALKER: And it is getting worse.
So I do challenge the notion of achieving deterrence in the best and

29. See Ken Belson, A Guilty Verdict: The Overview; Ex-Chief of WorldCom is
Found Guilty in $11 Billion Fraud,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16, 2005, at Al.

172

FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE &
FINANCIAL LAW

[Vol. XI

most desirable way.
I also challenge the Sarbanes-Oxley notion that it is okay, and it is
better now, because money does go back to the injured people.
Obviously, there is some truth to that, too. Sarbanes-Oxley allows the
penalties to be redirected to people who suffered harm.30 But it still does
not solve the problem of who is paying those penalties. It is still the
current shareholders that are stuck picking up the bill for that.
That is my take on this. There are some legitimate goals, but I
think some of them can be achieved by better means.
JUDGE MARTIN: Mr. Breeden, you have tried to help
shareholders in these types of companies. What is your perception?
MR. BREEDEN: There is some merit to the argument and the
concern about not wanting to penalize shareholders by imposing a fine
on the victims, the people who have already been victimized by the
fraud. I understand that argument. I think it is something that has to be
considered. All of these cases are really different. You need to not look
at them and think about them as all identical.
The facts and
circumstances of each one really are important: Who was involved?
How high up were they? How persistent was the conduct? How many
warning signs were there? How egregious is this?
With all due respect to Steve and Commissioners Atkins and
Glassman and some of the people who have been raising these
questions, I guess I would subscribe myself to Tim's comments at the
outset and the importance in both the criminal and the SEC enforcement
arena of deterrence, and deterrence on a large scale. I think it is a
critical thing that a message be sent to boards of directors that it is
essential for them to oversee their management team, and that there
could be very substantial consequences, which will affect them as
directors, if they allow it to happen by failing to supervise and failing to
oversee discipline and create the right incentives for the management
team.
We talk about how essential tone at the top is and the culture of
ethics. Does a given entity have a culture in which people give a wink
and a nod and lip-service to - "yeah, yeah, we need to do all this
compliance stuff' - but they do not really get it, and they are not really

30.
Douglas A. Henry, SubordinatingSubordination: Worldcom and the Effect of
Sarbanes-Oxley's Fair Funds Provision on Distributions in Bankruptcy, 21 EMORY
BANKR. DEV. J. 269 (2004).
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focused on dealing with those problems? There are other corporations
where you may have a more isolated situation. It is essential to reach
the boards and have boards of directors understand that one of their most
important responsibilities is overseeing the compliance and ethical
practices of the corporation, that it is a core competency for every major
company, that its ethical track record is as important as its financial
track record, and that they, the corporation, will be held accountable,
and, down the line, the board and the management.
I am troubled by this argument that you are penalizing the
shareholders. When you have a corporate fraud, in the SEC context only
- I am not speaking to the criminal side, but I will stick to my area of
expertise - there have been shareholders who benefited, as well as
shareholders who were hurt by the fraud. In the early stage of a fraud, if
a company is reporting earnings that it did not really generate, the
shareholders are benefiting in a real way. The stock is at a higher level
than it ought to be. They are able to access capital in larger amounts and
at lower cost than they would otherwise be able to do. That company
has a tremendous advantage compared to its competitors and may use
that advantage to distort the entire marketplace. So the shareholders
have benefited directly and substantially in many of these cases.
Now, that is shareholders at a moment in time when the fraud is
ongoing and has not yet been discovered. Then, when it is discovered,
the company, if it goes all the way into a WorldCom-type situation or
Enron - yes, there may be shareholders who are wiped out or severely
damaged. Those may not be the same ones who were benefiting. I do
not know whether we would ever be successful enough to track and say
whether the precise people were being hit with that consequence.
I think the message to the overall marketplace, though, to all
shareholders investing, to all people investing in bonds of troubled
corporations, is, look, there is an exposure for violations of the law. If
you have a serious financial fraud that involves conduct at high levels of
the corporation that is material in magnitude, persistent in time, knowing
in its dimensions, a serious financial exposure exists. Be on notice of
that when you are deciding what corporation to invest in. It should
matter to you what kind of a board of directors they have and what
priorities they place on the overall issue of ethics and integrity and
compliance in running the company. You may well have financial loss
if it turns out that you are an investor in a corporation that does not
invest what they need to do in obeying the law.
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I do not find that unfair. I think it is actually quite critical in the
broader deterrence structure to have as an element, in the right cases, the
ability to impose a substantial fine.
In the end, the obligations under the securities laws and the
financial reporting area are not the individual obligations of Mrs. CEO
or Mr. CFO; they are corporate obligations. The corporation has the
obligation to report, fully, fairly, completely, in a timely manner, its
financial results. They are doing so, knowing in advance that failure to
comply with the law is going to damage a wide spectrum of people employees, customers, shareholders, creditors of other kinds.
With that knowledge in advance, to me, having the exposure of
monetary sanctions against the corporation, which has the obligation
under the law, is not unfair, and I think it is, in general, good policy.
JUDGE MARTIN: Celeste, let me ask you this. We talk about how
these balances get struck when you are actually deciding whether or not
you are going to indict a particular corporation. I looked recently at the
Thompson factors, 31 and they seem not to give much weight to the harm
to shareholders. Am I misreading them?
MS. KOELEVELD: One of the factors is whether going after the
individuals is adequate to address the harms that have occurred. So the
very issues that we have been discussing so far here are really
incorporated in the Thompson factors. I think, under that rubric, you
could consider whether it would do more harm than good to go after the
corporation at some point, than not.
But I can say that, whether it is explicitly one of the Thompson
factors or not, I think it is something that goes into our calculus in the
U.S. Attorney's Office in deciding whether or not to prosecute a
corporation. One thing we do look at is exactly the nature of the
misconduct and how the corporation is responsible.
I disagree with the premise of the quotation that you began with,
that individuals commit the crimes and not corporations. Individuals are
not acting alone. They are acting through the corporation, and the
corporation should generally be held responsible for what it did.
I think, in terms of deterrence, I second - and third and fourth - the
comments that to create a culture of compliance and a culture of social
responsibility, it is important to, in appropriate cases, hold corporations

31.
Memorandum from Larry D. Thompson, Deputy Attorney General, to Heads of
Department Components, United States Attorneys (Jan. 20, 2003) (on file with author).
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responsible.
JUDGE MARTIN: Tim, the Justice Department has recently had a
number of cases in which there are deferred prosecutions. What are the
factors that go into determining whether or not you should prosecute or
have a deferred prosecution?
I should say on this, I like the idea of deferred prosecution with
monitors, and Mr. Breeden and I strongly encourage it.
MR. COLEMAN: I am glad you asked, Judge.
The concept of a deferred prosecution is something that is not new,
but it has gotten a lot of attention recently. In the last couple of years,
the Justice Department has entered, often with the participation of the
SEC, into about a dozen of these agreements with major corporations.
We can go back to the 1980s. There was a case with Prudential
Securities here in the Southern District that resulted in a deferredprosecution agreement. 32 But there were not many others until the last
couple of years, after the 2003 revisions to the Thompson Memo, which
specifically encouraged consideration of deferred prosecutions as an
alternative. 33
To step back for a minute, the decision about whether to indict a
corporation is one of the most difficult decisions that a prosecutor has to
make. You have to look at all the fundamental factors of principles of
federal prosecution and decide whether a crime has been committed,
whether somebody has committed it, whether there is really a federal
interest here, and so on. But there is an overlay on top of that of these
Thompson factors, of which there are nine, that make it an incredibly
complicated decision.
In prosecuting a large corporation - and the problem of the
bankrupt company is particularly difficult - you have to look at the other
stakeholders. Whatever benefit you might achieve by indicting the
company and likely putting it out of business is only going to come at a
great cost to other stakeholders.
One of the factors that we take very seriously - it is a factor in
every case, but particularly in a case against a corporation - is the
collateral consequences. What will the consequences be to individuals
or entities other than the defendant? We look at that in drug cases. Will

32. In re Prudential Securities Inc., No. 1005 M-21-67, 1995 WL 798907, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1995).
33.
See Thompson, supra note 31, at (vi)(b).
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prosecuting a husband-and-wife team who are smuggling cocaine from
their native country make their children orphans? It is the same concept,
but we are talking about a lot more people when we are talking about a
large corporation.
So we take that very seriously. One of the ways that we have tried
to deal with that very difficult issue is by encouraging prosecutors to be
more creative and innovative in coming up with resolutions that do not
necessarily involve a death sentence for the corporation. These deferred
prosecutions are not a panacea. It is not a good solution in every case,
but it is a good option in a range of cases.
What it allows us to do is to send a deterrent message by charging a
corporation criminally. It allows us to remediate the harm through a
fine, restitution, forfeiture, or some other payment of compensation by
the company. It allows us to work with the regulators - and we try to
work very closely with the SEC, the CFTC,34 FERC,35 whoever it is,
depending on the case - to try to come up with a fix for the corporation
that will allow it to reform itself so that the risk of a culture of
corruption will be minimized.
It also allows us to ensure continued employment for some very
good lawyers and other professionals that we know very well.
JUDGE MARTIN: We are happy for that great benefit.
Let us move on. We are talking about carrots and sticks. I think we
have seen some of the sticks. What are the carrots? What do you
extract by way of cooperation from the supplicants who come before
you in these enforcement proceedings in order to get the best deal
possible? Who makes those decisions?
Let us start with the attorney-client privilege. It seems to me that
the sentiment in the private bar is that there is no attorney-client
privilege anymore because if you are in an investigation with the Justice
Department or the SEC, you are simply going to be forced to waive it,
unless you want to be pinned to the wall. Is that a fair comment, Steve?
MR. CUTLER: Not about the SEC.
We actually issued a report about three years ago outlining the
elements that the Commission considers in determining how to reward,
or not, cooperation. The Commission expressly said that the touchstone
of cooperation was not waiver.

34.
35.

Commodity Futures Trading Commission.
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
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But now let me talk practically. What we do want is an ability to
understand what happened, and to understand that quickly. Sometimes
that means, as a practical matter, that corporations are going to waive the
privilege.
I guess the other thing that needs to be said in this area is that
cooperation is not like a light switch. We do not say to ourselves, okay,
they were cooperative, or they were not cooperative. There are going to
be gradations of cooperation. We have had plenty of corporations - I
assume we are talking about the corporate context - that have been
cooperative and rewarded for their cooperation without having waived
the privilege. We may try to find ways around waiver issues. We might
get a report orally, for example, from counsel about what it is that they
have seen during the course of an internal investigation.
But we do not, at the end of the day, make the waiver itself the
touchstone of whether an entity gets rewarded for cooperation.
JUDGE MARTIN: Tim?
MR. COLEMAN: To paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the
demise of the attorney-client privilege have been greatly exaggerated.
There really are not that many cases where corporations are
waiving the privilege, contrary to what you hear in many panels like this
one. Usually, what we are looking for is not what one would typically
think of as information covered by the attorney-client privilege, but we
are looking for information that would be covered by the work-product
doctrine. Typically, that is notes of interviews with employees that were
prepared in the course of an internal investigation of the company. That
is sort of the JUDGE MARTIN: May I just interrupt to ask, why is that not
calling for privileged information? The whole idea of the privilege for
the corporation is that your employees can talk to you. I understand the
need for those notes, but that certainly requires the waiver of the
privilege, does it not?
MR. COLEMAN: Sure. I do not want to split hairs about whether
it is work product or privilege. But if it is factual information about
what happened, as opposed to a request for legal advice or the rendition
of a legal opinion, arguably, it is work product, and different rules apply.
MR. CUTLER: Even if it is not, and even if it is a classic attorneyclient communication, I guess the way I have always thought about this
is that - and tell me if I am wrong - we ought to be less sensitive about
claims of privilege with respect to after-the-fact internal investigations,
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if you will, than we should be about invading the privilege when it
comes to contemporaneous advice rendered on the scene. We certainly
want to encourage people to seek out legal advice for hard problems as
they arise.
In my own mind, I have drawn a special circle around that sort of
attorney-client communication. I think it would be bad policy for the
government to chill that sort of communication and that kind of advice
seeking.
I really think differently, or not as sensitively, about the post-hoc
investigation, once everything has gone wrong. Now you have called in
Judge Martin to do an internal investigation. That is a different exercise.
Yes, there are sensitivities there, but not in the same sort of way.
JUDGE MARTIN: But doesn't that make it almost impossible for
me to do a really thorough investigation? I am called in. I have to tell
everybody, "Look, there is a thing called attorney-client privilege that
would normally protect this conversation. But you should know that in
this type of case, the SEC is going to insist we waive it."
You are effectively saying there is no privilege. If we view the
privilege as having a benefit in getting out the information, it has
restricted my ability, certainly, to get out that information.
MR. CUTLER: Although in a limited sort of way.
One, by the way, we are not going to insist that you waive the
privilege. Tim might. Celeste might. We will not insist on it.
But beyond that, when you start those interviews, Judge, you are
going to have to say, "You are talking to in-house counsel" - or
someone employed by the board of directors or whatever capacity you
are - "and you ought to know that if there is a privilege here, it belongs
not to you, but it belongs to the company." Now, at the end of the day,
maybe some individual will think, "Boy, I can't imagine this will ever
get turned over to the government." But that would be foolish thinking,
and the privilege does not even belong to that individual in the first
place.
JUDGE MARTIN: I think there is an argument to be made that we
should not even think that there is such a thing as the attorney-client
privilege in a corporate context. I remember back in the SEC-Vesco
case,36 Vesco was running this corporation for years. He was ultimately
thrown out by the SEC. Of course, the first thing the board did was

36.

SEC v. Vesco, 358 F. Supp 1186 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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waive the privilege, so everything he did was exposed. I am not sure
that people really should be relying on the privilege, in any event.
MR. BREEDEN: I just wanted to jump in on these investigations,
having participated in quite a few of them and having been very
involved in WorldCom. We were very upfront with people that what
they had to say was absolutely going to be, most likely, turned over to
the government.
The company had pledged complete and full
cooperation, and we were determined to get to the bottom of things. The
employees had a choice. They were either going to give what we
considered to be full and credible testimony and tell us everything they
knew about what had gone on, or they were going to be fired right there,
on the spot, and we were going to refer their names to every lawenforcement authority who would take our call. That is their choice.
MR. CUTLER: Now you know why we like Richard doing these
internal investigations.
MR. BREEDEN: We did not have a lot of people who were not
already talking to the Southern District who refused to talk to us. So we
did not need to promise people, "Look, if you tell us that you have been
a serial murderer of the accounting rules, we will not tell anyone else,"
in order to get the truth. "This is your Judgment Day, right here and
right now, and you have to decide which side of the law you are going to
be on. Are you going to cooperate fully and unburden your conscience
or are you not?"
So I think, in the big Enron, WorldCom, those kinds of frauds, the
availability of the promise of confidentiality through the privilege is
overblown as something that is necessary in order for the investigators
to get at it.
JUDGE MARTIN: Let us see what Dick Walker, as a general
counsel, thinks about the privilege.
MR. WALKER: I agree. I think the practice is, when something
goes wrong in a corporation and you bring in an employee, you give him
a pretty tough talk right up front and you basically tell him that it is part
of his responsibility as an employee - the code of conduct requires that
he either cooperate or not.
We always tell attorneys that they have to give them a very blunt
warning: "When we are talking to you, we are representing the
corporation. We are not looking out for your best interests. Now sit
down and please answer our questions."
So I think that is the practice that has developed.
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I do think, though, Tim, on something that you said, if the reports of
the demise of the attorney-client privilege are greatly exaggerated, just
as exaggerated are, frankly, some of the assurances that we get
sometimes that this is not an automatic, knee-jerk thing. This is
something that the government does seem to require. Though in SEC
parlance it is true that there is a mix of factors, if the SEC asks you to
waive the privilege and you are not willing to do that, I think most
people would conclude that they are not going to get the benefits of the
holy grail of cooperation that they seek.
There are some reasons why I think it is important for the SEC - for
instance, if an internal investigation has been done and submitted by a
company, I think it is appropriate and the SEC needs to be able to kick
the tires. They need to be able to look at interview notes to determine
whether the lawyer that has done the internal investigation has done a
credible and faithful job in reaching conclusions. I do not know too
many ways around that, other than showing the government the
interview notes and the kinds of materials that are prepared.
Similarly, when people say, "Do not sue me. I relied on the advice
of counsel," if you cannot somehow penetrate and find out what the
advice of counsel was and probe that, then it is very difficult to
determine whether that is really a credible and rational defense or not.
So there are certainly reasons why it can be done. But I think that
real practice is that it is done almost reflexively. In many instances, I
think there are better ways and there are alternate ways of getting the
same kinds of assurances that the government needs, without triggering
the kinds of consequences that you trigger once you waive the privilege.
This information is out for anybody and for everybody. You cannot
protect it at all. I think sometimes there are more limited ways of
serving the same goals.
JUDGE MARTIN: I notice that it is 7:07. We were scheduled to
stop at 7:00. The panel is now in the very dangerous position of
standing between an Irishman and the bar. But I think we should
continue for a few more minutes.
Because we have so many distinguished practitioners here, can we
see if any of them have any questions?
QUESTION: I would like to ask Richard, Tim, and Steve about
penalties for entities, how the answers they gave would be affected if
they knew that it was virtually certain that the results of that decision
would be the destruction of the corporation and the unavoidable loss of
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all jobs.
MR. BREEDEN: We certainly had that issue in WorldCom. I was
trying to distinguish in my remarks between financial penalties and
criminal indictment. Personally, my own observation is that criminal
remedy against a corporate entity, which is in most circumstances going
to be an immediate death sentence, should be reserved for the most
egregious of all egregious circumstances, and typically a company that
is not cooperating, that is resisting and, in some way, continuing
ongoing violations of the law.
I prefer to avoid the criminal sanction for a corporation entity and
use financial penalties wherever possible, because I think they do not
lead to that unavoidable loss of jobs and so on.
There were many people who argued that WorldCom was such a
corrupt enterprise that it should be put out of business. At that point we
had 75,000 employees who had not done anything wrong. We had
conducted what we believed to be the most thorough housecleaning any
company had ever undergone. It was really in the hands of some pretty
unimpeachable people, including a former Attorney General of the
United States, leading the special committee, Nick Katzenbach. 37 So I
strongly was of the view then, and remain so today, that an indictment
and putting the corporation out of business and throwing 75,000 people
into the street would have been very much the wrong course of action.
Our friends at Verizon, actually, disagreed strongly at the time,
although they have come around and recognize the benefits of
rehabilitation, I am proud to say.
So I do think that that is a very important consideration. In most of
these corporations, if the will is there - if a board will act, or a receiver
or a court imposing a monitor, or in any other form - if the will is there
to force a complete and total cleanup, these corporations can be turned
around, cleaned up, and rehabilitated. That is the course we ought to
follow. Indictment ought to come, in my personal opinion, when the
corporation refuses to go down that path, when there is no board or
somebody available to do that. Then you may have to go to another
remedy.
MR. COLEMAN: In any case where we are considering indicting a
corporation, we will get written submissions from the corporation
analyzing the Thompson factors. Invariably, there is a long section
37.

Nicholas Katzenbach was the sixty-fifth Attorney General of the United States.
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about how the collateral consequences will be that everybody will lose
all their investments, the corporation will be liquidated, and the world
will end.
Sometimes those arguments are more persuasive than others. But
we generally give them the benefit of the doubt. That is probably the
factor that we take the most seriously in looking at the costs of indicting
the corporation.
So I do not think my answer would change very much, because I
think we are already painfully aware of that consequence.
MR. CUTLER: I cannot disagree with anything that either Richard
or Tim has said. Richard's comments made me think about one of the
other factors, or at least considerations, that have weighed on my mind
over the last several years, and that is the notion of having a sufficiently
large spectrum of sanctions that you can differentiate the capital
markets' equivalent of ax murderer from the driver who exceeds the
speed limit.
That is one of the problems that may be unique to the SEC. We
have had injunctions and cease-and-desist orders and could try to
distinguish between those, or maybe between a fraud charge and a
books-and-records charge. But, boy, at the end of the day, that is a fairly
narrow band with which to either reward cooperation or, if you will,
penalize non-cooperation and to differentiate between very bad conduct
that may, as Richard said, even in extreme circumstance, warrant the
death sentence for the corporation and conduct that is a 10b violation,3" a
fraud on shareholders, but does not warrant the same sort of treatment.
That is one of the reasons that I think moving to a world in which
penalties are part of the SEC regime makes sense.
MR. BREEDEN: Just a footnote that I want to also toss in, playing
off Steve's comment. There is another really important dynamic here.
The availability of the $500 million fine or the criminal indictment helps
swing, in a practical world - often in these cases, there is a faction in the
board who is in favor of a complete and total cleanup- get rid of the
CEO, hire the toughest person you can find to come in and do a
complete and thorough cleanup, really make a clean breast of it, and
recognize there have been some bad practices. There may be other
people who are in a damage-control mode - "we will go through the
motions, we will offer up whatever we can, but we want to do as little to

38.
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change" - and, frankly, they are often people who have a personal
exposure for what they have done.
If the government stopped using these remedies as tools, you would
swing the balance inside the boardroom and inside the advice companies
are getting about how they need to respond to these situations - you
would swing it in favor of it being safer to try to go through the motions
without really cleaning it up. That would be a bad effect.
So the mere existence of these remedies, even if you do not use
them, has a really positive effect in many of these cases.
QUESTION: Is there any likelihood we will seek legislation to
[inaudible], which could go a long way towards solving this problem,
because it would allow people to give material to regulators and the
Justice Department [inaudible]? Does anybody know whether there is
any likelihood of that?
MR. WALKER: I do not think so. It has been circulated. It has
been part of bills. It has been discussed for years, but I do not think
there is much likelihood that that will happen.
QUESTIONER: Just to make a comment. The whole theory of
Sarbanes-Oxley was to encourage corporations to come forward. It is
perfectly logical for Congress to then reward that by legitimizing
[inaudible].
JUDGE MARTIN: What makes you think that Congress would
ever be perfectly logical?
Are there any other questions from the audience?
[No response]
Let me just talk about one more, and that is the question of
indemnification of employees and officers. Steve, there is a lot of
concern in the bar on the Lucent settlement. Would you like to expand
on that a little bit?
MR. CUTLER: Sure.
I actually think Lucent has been
misunderstood. That was not about indemnifying employees for the
expense of mounting a defense. It was not about paying for lawyers.
We like there to be good lawyers representing all interested parties. A
good defense actually ends up, usually, producing a better, more just
result. It is part of the adversarial process that I think makes the system
work.
Where the SEC gets concerned is if a corporation voluntarily particularly voluntarily, not pursuant to state law - indemnifies
individual employees for penalties or disgorgement remedies that they
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would otherwise suffer in an SEC or Justice Department action. And I
think that should be a concern. If an individual can look to his or her
employer to pay the freight and bear the cost of a penalty, I am not sure
we achieve all the deterrence that Dick was talking about at the outset.
In fact, it is the most important part of deterrence, making sure that
individuals know that if they do wrong, they are going to go to jail or
they are going to pay heavy fines. But if they can rely on someone else
to pay those fines, what good have we done? What deterrence have we
really achieved?
So I think it is critical that people be made to pay the fines that have
been imposed on them.
JUDGE MARTIN: We are about out of time. Perhaps I would ask
each of the panelists if there is anything they want to add on the topics
that we have had for discussion. Dick?
MR. WALKER: I think we have said it all.
JUDGE MARTIN: Actually, I was going to ask one more question.
We do not have time to get the answer. The question would have been,
do you think it appropriate for a government official to say that he
would not negotiate with a company unless they discharged their
chairman?
Thank you all very much.

